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Who Cares About Islamic Law?1

The legal transplant in the Arab world, perhaps even in the
Islamic world writ large, hasn’t had much luck by way of close
study in US legal academia. Compared to its scholarly treatment in
other non-Western contexts, such as Latin America and East Asia,
the absence is glaring. This was not for want of scholarly interest
in law in the Arab/Islamic world. Much has been published on
Arab constitutions for instance, and you’ve had a few speakers in
this lecture series, opine on the topic. Nor has there been lack of
scholarly interest in types of legislation that had become
symptomatic of our globalized world over the past two decades:
foreign investment laws, intellectual property laws, oil and gas
laws, and one must not forget that most unsavory yet pressing
subject, national security and anti-terrorism laws. Rather, what is
glaringly absent is the study of the “European Code”, the
privileged form in which the legal transplant was first introduced
only to become the permanent and defining feature of the
contemporary legal system.
There is a simple reason for this and I will state it bluntly. It is
because Islamist scholars and their non-Muslim academic
sympathizers either liberals with strong multicultural tendencies
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or “traditionalists” hostile to the modern nation state, have
hogged the study of law in the Arab/Islamic world. A consensus of
sorts has for long emerged among this block of scholars that the
legal transplant was a colonial imposition that has displaced, with
tragic consequences according to these scholars, the organic law
of the Muslim. It is the latter that is worthy of study, typically
referred to by them as “Islamic law”.
The crimes of the legal transplant seem endless according to the
Islamist and co literature. And it all depends on where you want
to put the “theoretical accent” so to speak. If you were an ethicist
with an Islamist persuasion, you treated the transplant and its
administrator modernist legal intelligentsia as symptomatic of the
loss of a pre modern ethico-religious educational system with its
learned juristic class, a loss that you then claimed caused all sorts
of bad things including ethical disorientation among
contemporary Muslims. You might even push the point further by
attributing the violence of fundamentalist Islam today to this very
ethical disorientation.
If you were of the “traditionalist” persuasion hostile to the nation
state, your position would be something of a spin off from the
ethicist one, where you would treat “tradition” as a form of
“discourse” that you argued the legal transplant displaced.
Tradition is important because it provided the Muslim with a
“world-view”-a way to know the world- that would be lost with
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modernity, liberalism, humanism, secularism, all of which the
legal transplant would somehow embody. According to this
traditionalist, change could only come from within “tradition”from its bosom so to speak and only incrementally. Any
“epistemological” rupture this tradition might suffer would be
calamitous and a legal transplant from-liberal, humanist, secular
Europe-with its own intelligentsia administrator class would be
exactly that.
You might have somewhat of a romantic version of the olden days
of “tradition”, in which case you would represent the advent of the
legal transplant as a sign of the fallen times never to be recovered.
According to this version, in the Muslim pre modern times, jurists
and faithful functioned as an organic unit that was distinctly
separate from rulers. The latter came and went, but the tight
embrace of jurist and faithful community was continuous over
time and outlasted the rotating dynasties of rulers. In this
embrace, jurists ruled according to the needs of the community
with whom they were organically connected. Something akin to
the (in)famous Qadi justice. I call this a romantic version because
the image is of a “unity” that is not riven with internal social
conflicts. The legal transplant came and it blew all that to
smithereens.
If you were of an “anti-imperialist” persuasion, you would ascribe
to the legal transplant the role of facilitating colonial rule by
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centralizing the legal system and codifying the books of the
Ulama. Centralization and codification you would then argue
turned an otherwise pluralistic pre modern legal system with
various jurists espousing different opinions on the same legal
issue into a uniform, rule-based formalist system of the
continental variety. The reader is then expected to experience a
great deal of dismay reading this because surely a pluralist system
was superior to a rule-based formalist one as the former gave the
judge or jurist options for ruling and room to maneuver while the
latter did not.
And if you were of the liberal legal publicist persuasion, you
would attribute to the old ulama class the functional role of
preserving the “separation of powers” from the ruler (the
executive) a role that you would then argue was lost with their
demise as transplant displaced jurists’ law. The consequences
could only be described as dire: marginalizing the only check on
authoritarian rule led to the entrenchment of the latter in the
Muslim world.
It follows then that given its outsider status and disruptive sins
too innumerable to count, the European legal transplant in the
Muslim world should be discarded as “superfluous” and unworthy
of academic study. Scholarly interest should more properly be
directed to studying that which was lost, and figuring out ways in
which to redeem it. Reconnecting Muslim to Muslims’ law from
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which he was unjustly and rudely separated should be academics’
most urgent project.
Thus there seems to be scholarly consensus in the US about the
law of the Muslim world, which if you break it down turns out to
be a consensus about law as an expression of identity. Law might
mean different things to different people in the world writ large,
but for “Muslims”, law is primarily a depository of identity.
The assertion that for Muslims law is primarily a depository of
identity seems to me to suggest a dual political project, the one
implied in the other, namely, turning the meaning of “Muslim”who is properly a Muslim?- and the meaning of “law”-what counts
properly as this Muslim’s law?_ into a locus of debate, even
conflict. If the social tapestry in the “Muslim” world is boiling with
various loci of conflict, around wealth distribution, around rights
and liberties, around political representation, the Islamist
proposition-adopted by Amerian academia- is to open one around
the identity of the Muslim and his law. It is an invitation to
discourse on identity by turning it into a question of debate.
While the Islamist project in the Muslim world has experienced a
great deal of success vis a vis the first leg of the proposition-who
is a Muslim?- it has yet to become victorious on the second:
Muslim’s law.
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Let me explain what I mean by telling you a story. Over the
summer, I was approached by BBC Radio Britain to debate an
author who had co-authored a book on the Gay International, its
virtues and vices, entitled, “Queer Wars”. The “Gay International”
is as some of you I am sure know, is premised on international
advocacy of gay rights driven by highly motivated Western gay
activists. The book was interesting and covered several regions in
the world where local gay rights struggle was unfolding. While
the authors adopted as their background position the common
“cultural imperialism is bad”, as one would expect from academic
authors these days, they nevertheless took a nuanced position
towards the various regions they discussed in the book
highlighting the complexity of the labor of international solidarity.
How, yes, it might help local activists to receive international
support and how, no, it might sometimes hurt them by exposing
them to attack and inciting open public homophobia. Except, they,
the authors that is, seemed clear that the Muslim world was not a
place where such “nuance” might hold. Their attitude in relation
to that “Muslim world” was simple: don’t even go there!
When I pushed back and insisted that there were indeed gay
rights activists in the Muslim world, that they too needed
“measured” international support and only when they asked for it,
and that there was indeed a difference, which the authors of the
book seemed to confuse between “internationalism” and
“universalism”, the former a question of political deliberation
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about the merits of international solidarity, while the latter a
question of principle that applied to Muslims just like everybody
else for Muslims too have universalist aspirations, my interlocutor
begged to differ. Not wise for Muslims, he repeated. Too
dangerous, he warned the BBC listening audience. The debate was
fast-paced, intense and lasted only twenty minutes. I emerged
from it feeling bruised. I felt that somebody had just thrown a
bucket of identity at me and asked me to sit in it. What was
uncanny was that my interlocutor experienced himself as
adopting a “progressive” position.
Why am I telling you this story? Because turning the “Muslim” –a
complex social being-into a homo Islamicus-a bearer of identity- is
an Islamist project. In fact, I think that the Islamist project is
premised on equating the Muslim with the homo Islamicus –
turning one into the other- by dropping from its account the
multiple ways of Islamist governance taking place over the past
three decades or so that had produced this “Muslim”, the
privileged subject of Islamist discourse. That is ever since what is
commonly referred to proudly among Islamists as “The Islamic
Awakening” peeked out its head in our midst. Failing to see the
ways in which this “Muslim” had been produced becomes then the
progressive marker, the point of pride, the moral certitude, of the
liberal multiculturalist like my interlocutor on the BBC radio
show. No gay rights for you Muslims because “gay” and “rights”
are foreign to who you are!
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At 54 years of age, and having born witness to the rise and
mounting influence of this Islamic Awakening among my peers, I
can give you a brief account of how I myself experienced it
especially as a woman. There is nothing dramatic in what I am
about to say, so don’t expect stories of cuttings, whippings, and
stone throwing. Nothing that would draw your pity juices, or your
tears of sympathy for the “oriental” woman, nothing that would
invoke the “violence” that would offend your Western liberal
sensibilities. It was all “voluntary” as the young Muslim feminists
of today- and their Western cohorts of the third wave-like to
assert! It was all voluntary, in a Saba Mahmoud kind of way.
The women of my generation witnessed the emergence, and soon
enough, hegemony, of what I will call “The Muslim woman
governance”. This “Muslim” woman appeared from our midst: our
family, our school, our workplace, and our neighborhood. She was
like us, and then one day, she was no longer. She “separated
herself from us” either affectively or socially or both because she
found a God that inspired her to submit to him. This God asked
her to cover herself so she wore Hijab. She covered her hair,
pulled her sleeves to her wrists and her skirt to her ankles. She
promised us his rewards if we were to veil ourselves too and
when we ignored her she threatened us with his rage. The torture
of the grave was only the beginning of our after death
punishment-ordeal for failing to obey his commands- when,
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according to the “Muslim woman”, we would be asked by an
archangel why we refused to veil ourselves during our lifetimes
and failing the test, we would be doomed to the “torture of the
grave”. Worms and snakes would crawl up our exposed non hijabi
skin and …well you can imagine where this horror scenario is
going.
My generation witnessed the increasing success of this “Muslim
woman”: we would meet with our girlfriends to celebrate
someone’s birthday, and one of them would show up having
adorned al hijab; we would go to school or to work and see a
classmate or colleague enter the room, shape transformed with
Hijab, we would go on a family visit and a cousin would proudly
saunter her way through the room hijab covered.
With the increased success of this Muslim woman and the
hegemony of her hijab our non Hijabi attire came to be signified
through differentiation as the dress of those Westernized
outsiders, or of those non believing “kuffar”, or of those
promiscuous harlots who want to seduce men; then towards the
end and as hijab became the costume of the majority, non hijab
became simply the attire of “Christians”. [Christians here is
reference to the Christian minority of the population, for even
prostitutes decided to don the hijab.]
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It was an astonishing feat! Testimony not just to the success of
Islamism as a social governance project but also, to how its
epistemology relied upon this social governance project as
ongoing background fact. It is when what we wore – whatever
that was- became understood socially as the negative of hijab(non) hijab- and when it became so unusual to come upon it in
public space, so much so that its wearer acquired the signification
“Christian woman”, it is then that the term “Muslim Woman”,
acquired its positivist meaning. To put this in less bullshitty terms,
you can’t have a “Muslim woman” a term much bandied about
these days, unless you’ve had a social project whose goal it was to
create a referent to this term, a person whose social profile fit the
signifier “Muslim woman”.
The whole thing was pretty darn awful especially if you were a
Christian woman. If you were, it was a double whammy. You
found yourself “Christianized” twice: both as a member of a
community now itself defined as “ the Christians” who the
Islamists rushed to assure us “have their own rights too”, seeing
your political citizenship swapped for sectarian membership, and
as one who wears her Christianity on her back-or rather her
“head”- in the form of a dress that screamed’ “here walks a
Christian”.
It wasn’t that when this Hijab of the “Muslim woman” hit our
shores that we were not or did not see ourselves as Muslim. We
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were and did, very much so. Our non-hijab was already modest.
We lived our lives-our friendships, romances, and work relationswith men as one would expect women to do in a socially
conservative society. There was of course room to maneuver,
interpret, play around and rebel in secret. But the discourse
around women’s bodies, dress, and sexuality was and remains to
this day supremely conservative. I tried to explain the way all that
worked –the norm and resistance to it-in my article on Honor
Killings so I refer you to it shamelessly.
The “Muslim Awakening” came and made this non-hijab-rather
our bodies themselves- a locus of identity conflict and it did so by
declaring our dress un-Islamic. This was open season on our
bodies. Not only did we find our bodies suddenly the center of
public debates about the propriety of our public appearance, with
men as born again Muslims speaking as the supreme authoritative
voices, whether in our own families, places of education, work
places or from the on high of the minaret, but it also exposed us to
the discipline of the street as street harassment put the rising
hegemony of Islamist doctrine into practice. We became fidgety
walkers, anxious about our public appearance, pulling our sleeves
down to the wrists, skirts down to the ankles, cleavage up to neck,
mimicking the hijab even when we were not hijabis. The Islamist
social governance project was now enacted on the very surface of
our skin and deep inside our neuroses. I am reminded of all this
when I go back home to visit and I see the hijabi women in my
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family rummage frantically reaching out for their scarves to cover
their head whenever a “strange” man entered the room. That we
didn’t do.
Social governance had turned into self-governance.
It was as if we transitioned within the family from the episteme of
“shame”-ayb in Arabic-back when we were a socially conservative
society that was Muslim- to the episteme of the religiously
prohibited or “haram” in Arabic- when we became Islamism’s
homo-Islamicus. Within the first episteme, we negotiated our
dress with our mothers who reminded us warningly: “What
would the neighbors say if they saw you dressed like that?”
aghast at our shorter than usual skirts. We would argue, plead,
explain, and offer compromises. Sometimes we won, making our
way out of the house feeling victorious, and sexy, other times we
lost, making our way back to our room feeling miffed and angry,
mumbling to ourselves about the God-awful backwardness of our
folk!
Within the second episteme, haram- when our dresses became the
locus of public debate, no longer just “the talk of the neighbors”
but that of the street, radio, Television, minaret, we came to
negotiate our dress with our born-again Muslim brother (or
neighbor, or local shopkeeper, or cabdriver) who spoke to us
authoritatively in the name of the divine law. Our dress had
entered with Islamicization a new discourse, one informed by
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“Islamic law” –or haram-it has become if you wish “legalized”- and
for it to exit the domain of the prohibited and enter the domain of
the permitted- as Islamists like to say, it had to be subjected to a
divine test about what could be revealed and what could not, how
much hands, how much feet, how much tightness, how much
color. It was no longer the neighbors who were watching, it was
the very eyes of God and not so lovingly. We were often reminded
of his wrath if we disobeyed. It was as if our attire passed from
our mothers’ “rational basis” test to our religious brother’s
“intermediate” or even “strict scrutiny” one.
Where is this going you ask yourselves and what has any of this to
do with the legal transplant? Well, I kind of think of the legal
transplant as like our pre hijab dress when we were simply
Muslim. Like that dress it became the locus of identity conflict that
Islamists had succeeded in triggering in the rest of the social body.
And like our pre-hijab, this positive law or al Qanun Al Wad’ee as
Islamists like to refer to it disparagingly, it was sufficiently
Muslim, it was kind’a Muslim, Muslim in a way nobody paid
attention to really or cared about, it was Muslim by default. Like
our dress, it was simply Muslim. It certainly had other problems,
but an Islamist strict scrutiny test of its identity was not going to
fix them. In fact, that proved to be nothing but a terrible
distraction, the kind that the right wing succeeds in doing by
recasting the problems of society in terms of threat to the tight
organic state that society was imagined to be before blacks,

13

migrants, feminists, etc despoiled it. For Islamists, it was before
the modern state and its secular Code despoiled it.
What is interesting is that this Islamist project of subjecting the
“European” Code to the test of Islamicity experienced something
of a golden age, albeit a brief one, with the rise of
constitutionalism in the aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet
Union. Like their peers in other places, constitutional courts in the
Arab world, for complex reasons that I won’t get into, became
increasingly open to the idea of judicial review of legislation.
Silent constitutional articles such as “Sharia is the sole source of
legislation” suddenly came to life, as the practice of judicial review
became the hottest law story in town. Different kinds of
legislation became judicially reviewed including ones, through
pressure from Islamist litigants, considered not “properly
Islamic”.
Islamic law scholars based in US academia chipped in with their
constitutional law proposals in a parallel movement of rise in
constitutional law scholarship. Some returned to books of Muslim
jurists, dusted off a few terms and used them to express
constitutionalism in Islamic terms, hoping to influence the way
simply Muslim judges approached their otherwise unfamiliar task.
Some offered ways to fashion the Islamicity test in a way that was
“normative” rather than strictly “doctrinal”, and some saw in
constitutionalism a way to sneak back “Islamic law”, in a kind of a
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silent coup d’etat in which Muslim’s jurist law acting as a form of
“natural law” refashioned, incrementally, rule by rule, the
culturally alien positive law. Judges performing judicial review
were praised for their “Muslim reasonable” ways, reassuring
Western readership that constitutionalism a “Muslim-reasonable”
way was what was needed in the Arab world and that there were
judges to boot already in place who could pull it all off.
This was not an enterprise that was devoid of anxiety. Islamist
litigants had a knack for attacking reform legislation touching on
women or religious minorities or freedom of expression and the
liberal scholar needed to open the Sharia door without letting in
those that would discredit it. While those scholars with liberal
sensibility set to work trying to come up with an Islamic doctrine
that was “authoritative but not authoritarian”, others declined the
defensive posture altogether and adopted instead the more
aggressive “difference” counter attack. In this posture, anything
that appeared on its face offensive to liberal humanist sensibility
was presented as “difference” that required understanding. In
other words, others went for the epistemological relativist
jugular. (Not lawyers!)
If you were an Islamic law scholar based in US academia and for a
good stretch of two decades, those were exciting times for you.
Judicial review and Sharia as the sole source of legislation gave
you the feeling that your work was relevant, that many lonely
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hours spent deciphering what dead brown men said in the tenth
century about the different levels of legality to characterize an
action was definitely worth it. Gulf countries with oil money to
spend lavished elite law schools in the US with money to set up
programs on Islamic law that gave value to your scholarship.
What you wrote was inserted inside the circuit of conferences and
symposiums financed by those programs. What you wrote was
hot stuff; it was on demand.
And this was a very good position to be in. The rising prestige of
US legal academia after the fall of the Berlin Wall made your
presence in it during this time a stroke of darn good luck. What
you wrote rode an already traveling vehicle of US academic
prestige and was being transported back to the “Muslim” world in
a way that was not possible before. You had a good shot at being
famous. The near collapse of academic institutions in those
countries, worn out by years of failing developmental states, made
their scholarship unable to compete. Whatever scholarship was
produced was either objectively inferior or acquired a secondary
status to your own given its very local location. You could afford
to be ignorant of what they did-though increasingly they could not
afford to be ignorant of you.
I mustn’t forget to mention- my pet peeve as I will explain in a
minute- that you also benefited from the US legal theory “cannon”
all of which you used in your Islamic legal reconstructive project.
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All of this made you sound smart, different, and original; you
turned Islamic law, an impossibly tedious topic to multitudes of
law students in the Arab/ Muslim world, into something exciting,
something intellectual almost. With the rise of Islamism, your
scholarship reassured young born-again Muslims that they could
be born again and intellectually sophisticated at the same time by
reading your scholarship. You were the “Muslim” jurist they had
not seen before and wished they did.
With the Arab spring and the rising fortunes of the Muslim
Brotherhood in Egypt, there was a moment, especially with the
passage of the Islamist Constitution of 2012, when you felt that
you were something of a jurist-in-waiting. There was a
constitution that was perfectly tailored to give your scholarship a
consultative status; surely, it was only a question of time before
you received a phone call to become the next sitting-Ikhwan
approved-justice on the Egyptian Supreme Court.
Alas with the mass demonstrations in June of 2013 against the
Ikhwan and their quick and cruel demise, all this came crashing
down. Just when you thought the Muslim had finally merged with
the homo Islamicus becoming indistinguishable-(the election
results after the fall of Mubarak certainly seemed to promise as
much)-and the world was ready for an “authoritative albeit not
authoritarian Islamic law”, Egyptian crowds came out by the
hundreds of thousands decrying the “Islamists” and their ways.
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“They acted like a closed sect”; “they treated themselves as the
knowing few whose mission was to educate us on Islam the
misguided many”; “they were only interested in their own”…was
some of the things you heard!
Oops! It turns out that “the authoritative and the authoritarian”
were closely aligned in people’s experience when it comes to
fixing their Islam. People were clamoring to become simply Muslim
again.
So what do you do NOW? ISIS is everywhere on the news. A whole
war, a global war, is declared on them and them alone. They kill
invoking the name of Allah. They invoke the rules of the Islamic. Is
this Islamic? They ask you everywhere you go. You are exhausted
trying to explain to them this was not “an Islam you recognize”. It
takes some work but you are already thinking your days of glory
have proven brief, much too brief. You explain, this was
Wahabism, a purist fundamentalist strand of Islam financed by
Saudi Arabia. It was a mistake for Egypt to forcibly remove the
Ikhwan from power; we warned them violence would only beget
more violence and would empower the fundamentalists. You try
again: Muslims have lost their way with the corrupt modern
secular state. They have become ethically disoriented. They
cannot tell right from wrong. And when it comes to homegrown
terrorism, Islamophobia breeds violence, you assert.
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You bravely soldier on with explanations, that is until a journalist
calls to ask you whether it was Islamic for a 14 year old boy to
refuse to shake the hands of his female school teacher as is
customary practice in Swiss schools and whether you thought the
little town in Switzerland that passed an ordinance fining any
student who refused to do so was Islamophobic. You feel like
throwing your phone against the wall. While you didn’t quite
mind being the mufti, it was not this kind exactly. You find
yourself thinking how is it that what promised to be a position of
Justice on the Egyptian Supreme Court ended up seeing you
playing the role of a mufti on the demands for exception of a
Muslim minority in the West, while fending off questions about
ISIS and Islamist violence.
What I am trying to say is that the Islamic law project that found a
friendly home in US academia has reached a dead end. With its
eye on transforming the legal system of the Muslim world, its
advocates find themselves today in a defensive position trying to
explain Islamist violence as it peeks its head in bursts almost on a
daily level, or alternatively, acting as mediators between a liberal
legal system and a religious minority clamoring for its own
Islamic exception.
This is all a shame in my view because this project has hogged
resources, intellectual, symbolic and financial that could have
gone elsewhere. It could have gone to rescuing the positive legal
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system in the Arab/Muslim world, the descendant from the legal
transplant, from its jurisprudential glut. All the elements were
there to do so. A revolution in rights advocacy had already started
in the nineties and showed its metal with the Arab spring. Rights
and liberties driven youth led the crowds assertively to the
overthrow of Mubarak. Equally assertively they approached the
courts. They read their constitution closely and argued their
rights from the provision of its articles. If the resources that went
to “Islamic law”, in which the Muslim was singled out as an
exception to the Comparative law of everyone else, and instead
went to lending “a theoretical hand” to the rights movement that
was a brewing, especially from US based legal theory, the most
innovative and developed in the world, we would be at a different
place today. Instead we seem to have been sidetracked by a long
and windy conversation on identity and difference, when all the
while we should have been talking about rights and liberties.
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